NATO’s role in the cyber domain is unclear.
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty
NATO’s role in the cyber domain remains unclear. Clearly, NATO will seek to protect its own networks and platforms. Yet, the extent to which NATO’s remit expands further remains to be seen.
It is unclear how Article Five will apply to cyber attacks. Clearly, petty cyber crimes and financial fraud are outside of NATO’s remit. However, it is at least plausible that Article Five could be invoked if a state experienced a serious cyber attack on critical national infrastructure. An attack threatening vital goods and services, such as the provision of electricity or water, would be regarded as a significant incident that could potentially justify the use of Article Five in response to a cyber attack.
Equally unclear, is what a NATO response would look like. If the intended strategy is to respond to serious cyber attacks in kind, NATO would have to develop its own cyber weapons. This would be problematic given the inexperience and technical limitations of a NATO workforce that has not previously operated in the cyber domain. Alternatively, NATO could respond to cyber attacks through more traditional expressions of power: via armed soldiers, missiles, navy vessels, and fighter jets. Although potentially more viable, precedents over the point at which a cyber attack merits a physical or kinetic response are yet to be established by the international community.
The Tallinn Manual, produced by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), has, has sought to respond to some of these questions by exploring how international law can be applied to cyber conflicts. However, the study is regularly misunderstood. Although commissioned by the NATO CCDCOE, the Tallinn Manual does not represent NATO doctrine and is purely an academic, non-binding study, intended to make a start in answering some of the contentious legal questions posed by cyber conflicts. In this regard, whilst the Tallinn Manual makes an important academic contribution, it by no means clarifies NATO’s evolving role in the cyber domain.
Although NATO has adapted to evolving security threats before, the cyber domain offers altogether new challenges.
First, there are a number of flaws in the militarisation of the cyber domain. The majority of those with the necessary technical skills to respond to the cyber security challenges work outside of the military sector. In addition, a large proportion of the infrastructure within the cyber domain is privately owned and operated. This prevents NATO from making a substantial contribution to its protection. Crucially, NATO does not have any rights, or powers, to intervene in the private sector. Given NATO’s current lack of expertise in the area, private sector firms are unlikely to welcome NATO assistance.
Second, not all NATO members agree on the role the organisation should play in the cyber domain. Given the sensitivity of information, states such as the US and UK appear to prefer close collaboration with only a small group of trusted countries. Intelligence-sharing platforms such as Five Eyes (between the US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand) are preferred. In this regard, small, high-trust cooperation forums may be viewed more favourably in the cyber domain when compared to other security domains.
From NATO’s original remit to provide collective defence in a post World War period, the organisation has evolved numerous times, adapting to the challenges faced by the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of terrorist cells and other non-state actors since 9/11. Although the cyber domain brings altogether new challenges, it would be unwise to write NATO off just yet.
