Black Hat Budgeting: What would you do with US$1 million?

Recently, I wondered: How much to spend on digital security? I'd like to put that question in a different light by imagining what a black hat could do with a $1 million budget. 

The ideas in this post are rough approximations. They certainly aren't a black hat business plan. I don't recommend anyone follow through on this, although I am sure there are shops our there who do this work already.

Let's start by defining the mission of this organization, called Project Intrusion (PI). PI is in "business" to steal intellectual property from organizations and sell it to the highest bidders. In the course of accomplishing that mission, PI may develop tools and techniques that it could sell down the food chain, once PI determines their utility to PI has sufficiently decreased.

With $1 million in funding, let's allocate some resources.
    
Staff. Without people, this business goes nowhere. We allocate $750,000 of our budget to salaries and benefits to hire the following people.
    
The team leader should have experience as a vulnerability researcher, exploit developer, penetration tester, enterprise defender, and preferably an intelligence operative. The leader can be very skilled in at least one specialty, say Web apps or Windows services, but should be familiar with all of the team's roles. The team leader needs a vision for the team while delivering value to clients. $120,000.
    
The team needs at least one attack tool and technique developer for each target platform, or technology, that PI intends to exploit. PI hires three. One focuses on Windows OS and client apps, one on Web apps, and one on Unix and network infrastructure. $330,000.
    
The team hires two penetration operators who execute the team leader's mission directives by using the attack tools and techniques supplied by the developers. The operators penetrate the target and establish the persistence required to acquire the desired intellectual property. $180,000.
    
The team hires one intelligence operative to direct the penetration operators attention toward information of value, and then assess the value of exfiltrated data. The intel operative interfaces with clients to make deals. $120,000.
    
Technology. The team will need the following, for a total of $200,000.
     
Lab computers running the software likely to be attacked during operations
    
Operations computers from which the penetration operators run attacks
    
Network connectivity and hosting for the lab computers and operations computers, dispersed around the world
    
Software is required by the team, since many good attack tools are commercial. MSDN licenses are needed too. There's no need to steal these; we have the budget!
     
Miscellaneous. The last $50,000 could be spent on incidentals, bribes, team awards, travel, or whatever else the group might require in start-up mode.   

If the attack developers manage to make enough extra money by selling original exploits, I would direct the funds to additional penetration operators. It would take about six of them to support a sustainable 24x7 operation. With only two they would need to be careful and operate within certain time windows.

So what is the point of this exercise? I submit that for $1 million per year an adversary could fund a Western-salaried black hat team that could penetrate and persist in roughly any target it chose to attack. This team has the structure and expertise to develop its own attack methods, execute them, and sell the results of its efforts to the highest bidders. 

This should be a fairly scary concept to my readers. Why? Think about what $1 million buys in your security organization. If your company is small, $1 million could go a long way. However, when you factor in all of the defensive technology you buy, and the salaries of your staff, and the scope of your responsibilities, and so on, quickly you realize you are probably out-gunned by Project Intrusion. PI has the in-house expertise to develop its own exploits, keep intruders on station, and assess and sell the information it steals.

Worse, PI can reap economies of scale by attacking multiple targets for that same $1 million. Why? Everyone runs Windows. Everyone uses the same client software. Everyone's enterprise tends to have the same misconfigurations, missing patches, overworked staff, and other problems. The tools and techniques that penetrate company A are likely to work against company B. 

This is why I've always considered it folly to praise the U.S. Air Force for standardizing its Windows deployment with supposedly secure configurations. If PI looks at its targets and sees Windows, Windows, some other OS that might be Linux or BSD or who knows what, Windows, Windows, who do you think PI will avoid? 

It's all about cost, on the part of the attacker or defender. Unfortunately for defenders, it's only intruders who can achieve "return on investment" when it comes to exploiting digital security.
Tao Security: http://bit.ly/1Ezkamy