Attackers Can Use RAM To Steal Data From Air-Gapped Networks
A new attack technique that relies on radio signals from memory buses to exfiltrate data from air-gapped systems has been identified.
The exploit is a novel side-channel attack that has been found to leverage radio signals emanated by a device's Random Access Memory (RAM) as a data exfiltration mechanism, posing a threat to air-gapped networks.
Air-gapped systems, typically used in mission-critical environments with exceptionally high-security requirements, such as governments, weapon systems, and nuclear power stations, are isolated from the public internet and other networks to prevent malware infections and data theft.
The technique has been codenamed RAMBO by Dr. Mordechai Guri, the head of the Offensive Cyber Research Lab in the Department of Software and Information Systems Engineering at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel. "Using software-generated radio signals, malware can encode sensitive information such as files, images, keylogging, biometric information, and encryption keys," Dr. Guri has said in a newly published research paper.
"With software-defined radio (SDR) hardware, and a simple off-the-shelf antenna, an attacker can intercept transmitted raw radio signals from a distance. The signals can then be decoded and translated back into binary information." Guri says.
The exploit does require that the air-gapped network is first compromised by using either an insider, poisoned USB drives, or a supply chain attack, thereby allowing the malware to trigger the covert data exfiltration channel.
RAMBO is no exception, in that the malware is used to manipulate RAM such that it can generate radio signals at clock frequencies, which are then encoded using Manchester encoding and transmitted so as to be received from a distance away. The encoded data can include keystrokes, documents, and biometric information. An attacker on the other end can then leverage SDR to receive the electromagnetic signals, demodulate and decode the data, and retrieve the exfiltrated information.
The technique could be used to leak data from air-gapped computers running Intel i7 3.6GHz CPUs and 16 GB RAM at 1,000 bits per second, the research found, with keystrokes being exfiltrated in real-time with 16 bits per key.
"A 4096-bit RSA encryption key can be exfiltrated at 41.96 sec at a low speed and 4.096 bits at a high speed," Dr. Guri said. "Biometric information, small files (.jpg), and small documents (.txt and .docx) require 400 seconds at the low speed to a few seconds at the fast speeds... This indicates that the RAMBO covert channel can be used to leak relatively brief information over a short period."
There are several defensive and protective measures that can be implemented to prevent the RAMBO attack.
These counter measures to block the attack include enforcing "red-black" zone restrictions for information transfer, using an intrusion detection system (IDS), monitoring hypervisor-level memory access, using radio jammers to block wireless communications, and using a Faraday cage.
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